

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9796

18 June 1981

West Europe Report

(FOUO 29/81)



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/9796

18 June 1981

WEST EUROPE REPORT

(FOUO 29/81)

CONTENTS

THEATER FORCES

FRANCE

Distribution, Use of Latest Weapons Described
(Max Simon; ARMEES D'AUJOURDHUI, Apr 81)..... 1

TERRORISM

FRANCE

Briefs
New Terrorist Group 4

ECONOMIC

ITALY

Arab Influence in Banking, Industry Expanding
(Enrico Morelli; IL MONDO, 8 May 81)..... 5

Editorial on Need for Review of Industrial Problems
(Editorial, Carlo Mario Guerici; IL MONDO, 1 May 81)..... 7

- a -

[III - WE - 150 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

POLITICAL

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Constitutional Impediments to Luso-Iberian Military Intervention (LA PENINSULE LUSO-IBERIQUE, 1980).....	9
---	---

FRANCE

Briefs National Security Council	15
-------------------------------------	----

PORTUGAL

Political Instability, Developing Schisms Within Military (LA PENINSULE LUSO-IBERIQUE, 1980).....	16
--	----

MILITARY

FRANCE

Budgeted Military Strength for Current Year Detailed (AIR & COSMOS, 9 May 81).....	21
---	----

THEATER FORCES

FRANCE

DISTRIBUTION, USE OF LATEST WEAPONS DESCRIBED

Paris ARMEES D'AUJOURDHUI in French Apr 81 pp 28-29

[Article by Lt Col Max Simon (Air Force): "A New Display of Weapons"]

[Excerpts] A completely new display of weapons for use by combat air units is beginning to appear. It is a particularly extensive display because of the variety of targets to be destroyed or neutralized.

Air-to-Air Weapons

Despite the improvements to the 30-mm cannon, whose effectiveness and value no longer need be demonstrated, the Air Force has introduced two missiles: the highly specialized Super 530 and the Magic, adaptable to all combat aircraft.

The Super 530 F1, put in service with units of the air defense forces in 1979, is the end result of a program launched in 1968. It is an interceptor missile with an auto-guidance system mated with the Cyrano IV radar of the Mirage F-1. It is capable of destroying, from a great distance, enemy aircraft flying at very high altitudes and high speeds. The successful firings in 1980, during a firing exercise by unit pilots against a typical target, permitted verification of the formidable effectiveness of this weapon.

The Magic is the first air-to-air missile designed for close-range air combat. It fulfills a requirement to fill the gap between the cannon, whose effectiveness diminishes beyond 600 meters, and the interceptor missiles with reduced efficiency below 3,000 meters [altitude]. Its introduction in 1977 drastically changed the techniques used for aerial combat because of the improvement in performance it has brought to the aircraft-missile system. Thanks to its considerable range, the Magic, in effect, provides its carrier with a considerable advantage.

It is equipped with a self-guidance system flexible enough to allow it to be independent of the aircraft weapons system. This is a considerable advantage and has led the Air Force to use it in all its fighter planes: Mirage F-1, Mirage III, Mirage V and Jaguar, giving those planes an improved air-to-air combat efficiency during aerial defense missions as well as for self-defense when attacked from the ground.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Air-to-Ground Weapons

The following four new weapons complement, or will shortly complement, the Air Force arsenal:

- cluster bombs, currently in service
- runway bombs
- adapter (kit) for drag bombs,
- laser guided weapons, which will be in use shortly.

The cluster bomb belongs in the category of area suppression weapons and consists of a container that holds a large number of clustered explosives: anti-tank grenades, antipersonnel grenades or explosives for area interdiction, the function depending on the nature of the target. These grenades are scattered fairly evenly to cover a large area effectively. A single Jaguar, equipped with cluster bombs, is capable of neutralizing the area in which a tank company is deployed in attack or march formation. The cluster bomb can be adapted to all military aircraft.

The runway bomb breaks up the concrete clabs by exploding after having penetrated them. It prevents the use of airport runways and, indirectly, makes it possible to ground enemy aircraft. Of smaller dimensions, it is carried in large numbers, and just two aircraft are sufficient to neutralize an airstrip.

Drag bombs weighing 125 to 250 kg, are weapons whose air effectiveness is being doubled by varying the angle of impact and the vertical speed. This is done by a drag-brake device which has made it possible at minimum cost to increase the value of a bomb already in service.

The laser-guided weapon fulfills the requirement to increase the precision of firing while at the same time decreasing the vulnerability of the aircraft to surface-to-air missiles. Its development was decided on in 1977 and was preceded by a "pre-feasibility" study in 1976. It is a whole system of improved weapons to be used to attack stationary and defended infrastructure targets. It consists of:

- a specific fire control system, with the principal element being a nacelle [pod] having several functions, including the illumination of the target with a laser beam;

- two projectiles equipped with laser guidance: an A.S.30 missile and a 1,000-kg bomb.

This system allows the identification of targets at ranges two to three times greater than those detected with the naked eye. After firing, executed at a great distance, the aircraft is able to disengage and leave the danger zone. The automatic television tracking system within the nacelle enables the laser beam, in effect, to be kept pointed in the direction desired by the pilot. The firing precision is remarkable and the accuracy obtained with these two types of projectiles is within 5 meters of the target. The laser-guided missile is the first air-to-ground weapons system designed for such use. It will equip certain units of the tactical air forces FATac-1^{er}A. equipped with Jaguars.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Lieutenant Colonel Max Simon entered the Air Force Academy in 1958, qualified as a fighter pilot and has served in every position of responsibility in a combat air squadron. A graduate of the 36th class of the ESCA [Ecole Superieure de Guerre Aerienne], since 1979 he has been assigned to the post of Chief "Weapons" Division, Office of Materiel Planning, Air Staff.

COPYRIGHT: 1981--Revue des forces armees francaises "Armees d'Aujourd'hui"

9739

CSO: 3100/708

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TERRORISM

FRANCE

BRIEFS

NEW TERRORIST GROUP--A new clandestine Corsican group was organized in mid-March 1981 somewhere in Corsica's eastern plain. It has nothing in common with the perpetrators of the Ajaccio attack. Like the FLNC [Corsican National Liberation Front] these pro-independence elements have decided to observe a truce until 10 May 1981. But they want to initiate an escalation following the presidential elections, if Valery Giscard d'Estaing wins, while changing their methods. They would no longer resort to night terrorism. They would no longer place explosives among agricultural produce. Rather, the new core is getting ready for a more military phase of operations. Its leaders had decided to call themselves the Corsican Revolutionary Action, acronym ARC. It is this same group which was known as Action for Corsican Renaissance until the Aleria incidents in 1975. There is no question about it. They are seeking another designation. For these activists who conceal themselves under a new identity have a long history as dynamite-users. And they wish to have nothing in common with the Simeoni brothers whom they characterize as "wait-and-see individuals" and "reformists." [Text] [COPYRIGHT: 1981, S.A. Groupe Express] [Paris L'EXPRESS in French 25 Apr 81 p 119] 2662

CSO: 3100/755

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ECONOMIC

ITALY

ARAB INFLUENCE IN BANKING, INDUSTRY EXPANDING

Milan IL MONDO in Italian 8 May 81 pp 217-218

[Article by Enrico Morelli: "Saudi Promises Petrodollars"]

[Text] It was an announcement that Abdullah Ammar Saudi, president and general manager of the UBAE [Arab Italian Bank], the Italo-Arabic bank with head offices in Rome and Milan, had awaited for 4 years. A telex message from Paris on Monday 27 April, signed by Mohamad Mahmoud Abushadi, president of the UBAF [Union of Arab and French Banks] (the bank that controls the UBAE and other mixed-ownership banks in various countries), informed Rome that the UBAF group, formed 11 years ago with three French banks (Credit Lyonnais, Banque Francaise du Commerce Exterieur and Banque Generale du Phenix), had now become all Arabic. The 27 Arabic banks comprising the UBAF will now raise their total holdings from 60 percent to 99.99 percent, leaving a symbolic holding to the Credit Lyonnais, which will continue as a special consultant to the group.

Saudi, who received the message during a meeting of the partners of the UBAE, called to approve the budget, explained the situation as follows to IL MONDO: "The decision, which will enable a closer cooperation with the French banks at the national level, aims to develop the activity of the Arabic banks in the various countries." The UBAE, for example, will no longer be controlled (indirectly though it may have been and through a minority holding) by the three French banks, but by an Arabic group and by the Italian banks and enterprises that participate in its capitalization: Banco di Roma (7.5 percent), Banca Nazionale del Lavoro [BNL] (7.5 percent), ICIPU [Credit Institute for Public Interest Companies] (4.5 percent), SOFID [expansion unknown] (4.5 percent), STET [Telephone Finance Corporation] (4.5 percent), ILIIC [Ligurian Institute for Industrial and Commercial Profit Sharing] (IRI [Industrial Reconstruction Institute] 4.5 percent), Condotte d'Acqua (4.5 percent), FIDIS [Financial Trust for Development] (Fiat 4.5 percent).

Saudi feels the time is now approaching to strengthen the Arabic presence in Italy by increasing the UBAE's capitalization from its present 15 billion to 50 billion [unit not given], so as to be able to develop its gross business volume, which in 1980 reached 1,000 billion and yielded a profit of 3.8 billion. Saudi's objective is to bring into the UBAE, with a share of around 6 percent of the holdings, the bank of which, for the past year, he has been vice president and general manager, the ABC (Arab Banking Corporation).

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

"On 17 January last year," Saudi tells us, "we formed this big bank in Bahrain with a capital of \$1 billion divided equally among the states of Kuwait, Libya and Abu Dhabi. The bank is owned by the three participating states but its management is commercial."

After leaving the presidency of the Libyan Arab Bank, with which he is still connected as a consultant and as a director on the board of Fiat (together with the governor of the Central Bank of Libya, Regeb A. Misallati), Saudi used his ties with industry and international finance to form the ABC. "By the end of its first year, but in reality after only a half-year of actual operations," says Saudi, "the bank, with a paid-in capital of \$375 million, had made a profit of \$45 million, which it put into reserves. By the end of the first quarter 1981, the bank had deposits totaling \$2,022 million, loans totaling \$595 million, and operations with other banks totaling \$2,221 million. Meanwhile, its assets had risen to almost \$800 million."

During the first quarter this year, the ABC rose from 50th place to 7th among the most active banks as lead manager in the floating of loans on the Eurodollar market (according to the classification drawn up by Caploan International Finance Data, Inc), topping prestigious banks such as Morgan Guaranty and Bank of Montreal (the leading Italian Bank in this respect is Banco di Napoli in 42nd place, followed by Banco di Roma and BNL). The ABC was one of the lead managers in the recent loan of \$500 million for the ENI [National Hydrocarbons Agency] and is participating in the same capacity in the floating of a \$1-billion loan for the Cassa del Mezzogiorno [Bank for Southern Italy]. "Another loan, presently only in the planning stage, concerns Fiat," says Saudi, "but its size will be smaller than the funding one for the ENI." Saudi participates also in this manner in the growth of the Fiat group, into which Libya entered 4 years ago with a 10-percent share (it was Saudi's second Libyan investment in Italy after Libya's entry into the UBAE in 1975 with a 7-percent share). "Our experience has been gratifying," says Saudi, "and we are happy with the management. This is why we are taking part in the recent capitalization increase, which will enable the making of new investments. Our decision to invest fresh capital in the Fiat group is based not so much on our interest in the automotive sector as in the sectors into which Fiat has diversified its activities."

Will Saudi follow these two investments with others in Italy? The Libyan banker is prepared to consider other business in the banking as well as the industrial areas, "but not in a secondary role," Saudi explains. "It must be a substantial participation--an investment that will mean a true involvement."

Arabic investments would bring into Italy part of the petrodollars needed to pay for the country's energy needs, particularly since Italy can no longer rely upon the weakness of the dollar. "During the coming years," Saudi explains, "the trend of the American dollar will be tied more to that of oil than to that of gold." And even if the Arabs should be caught up by the lure of the yellow metal, their greatest wealth will always be their oil.

COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1981.

9399
CSO: 3104/271

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ECONOMIC

ITALY

EDITORIAL ON NEED FOR REVIEW OF INDUSTRIAL PROBLEMS

Milan IL MONDO in Italian 1 May 81 p 11

[Editorial by Carlo Mario Guerici: "Phase 4 Is Needed"]

[Text] To revive Italian industry requires a clear understanding of its problems and gifted human talent.

The lively debates on the indexed wage scale, and on Phase 2 and Phase 3 of the economic policy, show, though in an extremely confused manner, that there is some movement toward taking cognizance of the nation's basic problems. But one gets the impression that the solutions being proposed by the several sides are not at all exhaustive. The fundamental aspects of the present state of the Italian productive system are still shrouded by many uncertainties. The government keeps adding a number of (useful) modifications to a number of unproductive or poorly drafted laws (61, 75, 787, the so-called Prodi law), the labor unions stress the many sanctuaries in the industrial policy and the responsibilities of the private enterprisers, and CONFINDUSTRIA [General Confederation of Italian Industry] in turn accuses the government and the conflictual attitude of the labor confederations.

But it must be recognized that none of these operators has yet proposed a fully worked out and modern plan for an industrial policy. Although perhaps during the 1980's there may be less shocks from the raw materials supply standpoint, other no less important ones will arise from the intensity of the competitive efforts many industrial nations will be deploying to regain shares of markets in sectors that too frequently we have obstinately considered to have reached their maturity. Other limitations and barriers to Italian industrial growth will be generated by the innovative liveliness those countries will be displaying with respect to high-technology-intensive production.

To meet these coming changes, and of course to meet the competition from the countries that will be surfacing in sectors that are presently a sort of private Italian domain, Italy seems to be totally devoid of any orientation or basic strategy. And, despite its many limitations, some of which are of major significance, the Report on State Participation by the minister of state participation, Gianni De Michelis, appears to be the only point of reference around which discussion and incitement to action can be started up and broadened.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Any attempt to accomplish these purposes through an industrial program characterized to any extent by inflexibility is, in our view, certain to meet with failure. Within these terms of reference, the determinant elements in this new phase which could be called Phase 4 of Italian economic policy would include: a plan for the rationalization and orientation of public demand (which of course includes not only that of the central organizations), a decisive strengthening of certain organizations in their coordinative roles (as Sergio Vacca has for some time advocated in the case of ENEL [National Electric Power Agency]), a more farsighted policy of research and support for design and experimentation activities, a better use of public financing and rescue operations, and the setting up of production rationalization incentives different from those of the past.

If the minister of industry, Fillippo Maria Pandolfi, undertakes to actuate such a policy, an overall view of the problems of industry will stand him in good stead; and to draw one up he will have to overcome the animosity of the sides concerned, as had to be done in the case of wage-indexing. Each sector has its specific problems, but each one shares with the others a number of basic limitations for which many persons bear responsibility. Phase 4 demands a clear outlook on things, in which an examination of managerial inertia, of governmental sanctuaries, and of labor union attitudes can serve to provide a convincing explanation, and not a factious one, of the causes that have led to the shattering of all the illusions of past years. Post-industrial era indeed!

COPYRIGHT: IL MONDO 1981.

9238
CSO: 3104/271

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

POLITICAL

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

CONSTITUTIONAL IMPEDIMENTS TO LUSO-IBERIAN MILITARY INTERVENTION

Paris LA PENINSULE LUSO-IBERIQUE in French 1980 (signed to press 3rd quarter of 1980) pp 117-122, 222-223

[Text of Chapter 1 ("The Military and the Constitution") of Part 3 ("Military Intervention: Inciting and Inhibiting Factors") in the book "The Luso-Iberian Peninsula" by Alberto Santos, National Defense Studies Foundation, Journal No 18, Supplement to Paris STRATEGIQUE in French, issue no 8 (4th quarter of 1980) 235 pp]

[Text] Today, at a time when the political situation is becoming increasingly unstable both in Spain and in Portugal, one has the impression that the military hierarchy is adopting an attitude of "temporary retreat" from the political game, somewhat softened by the propensity of the military to intervene in political life. This poses a problem, particularly since one must not forget that intervention by the Portuguese and Spanish military in political life is as much the product, if not more, of specific historical factors as of temporary situations.

Why this "temporary" (which we have stressed) withdrawal of the armed forces of these two countries with strong military traditions?

It is a fact that the programs for the modernization of the armed forces now in progress have something to do with it. These programs, supported basically by aid from and military cooperation with the United States, and which, as has been mentioned, give the Spanish army a greater functional value than the Portuguese army, are contributing to decreasing the potential for intervention by the military in the political field.¹ But it seems to us that another factor is contributing to this state of affairs, and that is the attitude of the military toward the constitutional text.

The Portuguese constitution of April 1976 and the Spanish constitution of December 1978 were drafted under different circumstances, which necessarily had their effect on the spirit of the texts.

While the Portuguese constitution was drafted during a particularly agitated period when everything was moving very fast, the Spanish constitution was drafted during a period which was restive indeed, but calmer and most important, dominated by the search for a consensus. It was the product of long negotiations and compromise² among the political forces on almost all of the major problems confronting Spanish society.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The constitutional texts adopted on 2 April and approved on 25 April 1976 by the complex of parties represented in the Assembly of the Portuguese Republic, with the exception of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party], which abstained, were drafted by men influenced by the social fervor and the proliferation of revolutionary myths propagated during 1975. As a result, these texts, although approved five months after the calm conclusion of a prerevolutionary period, reflect the political and ideological contradictions which characterize Portuguese society. They are the product of a contract reached first of all between the political parties and the military officers in the Council of the Revolution affiliated with the Group of Nine, and then between the political parties and the whole of the military hierarchy represented within the Council of the Revolution. In fact, after the events of November 1975, the prosocialist military officers in the Council of the Revolution (Group of Nine) were led to reach a compromise with the commanders in chief of the three armed branches in the Council of the Revolution, who were interested in the reestablishment of military morale on a priority basis. This double contractual aspect was such that the constitution became the juridical expression of a rigid and ambiguous plan for society which soon became the subject of controversy. While a portion of the left wing, in particular the PCP [Portuguese Communist Party], made a fetish of the constitutional text, the vast majority of the political leaders, including the president of the republic, foresaw the need for revision of the texts deemed incapable of stabilizing the political situation and making the institutions more effective according to constitutional norms, as early as 1976-77.

Today the constitution is the burning focus of contemporary controversy. The present government, since it took office, has adjusted badly to the constitutional constraints. It had envisaged a referendum with a view to the overall revision of the text, but without success, in view of the unconstitutionality of the act itself; in fact, the constitution does not provide for any referendum of this sort. The desire of the government to "de-ideologize" the constitutional text is not due to the epistemological heaviness of some of the passages, overimpregnated with Marxist ideology, which in our view was already outdated at the time the experts sat down to draft them, but above all to the need to make the adjustments deemed necessary in the realm of military participation in the political regime, and above all the desire to put an end to the political dominance of the Council of the Revolution, which is moreover destined to cease to exist in 1981 if the deputies so decide.

The 1976 Portuguese constitution assigns important functions to the military in the development of the political life of the national community. One of its main innovations lies in particular in the role assigned to the military in articles III no 2, X no 1, 142 and 273³, which clarify the rigid and ambiguous nature of the constitution.

The goal proposed to the armed forces, as described for example in article 273, no 4, is unique in terms of what is found in other Western democracies. It is stated that the armed forces "has a historical mission of guaranteeing the 'conditions' (our quotations for emphasis) which will allow a peaceful and pluralistic transition of Portuguese society toward democracy and socialism." If one interprets this article in a static way, one is led to state that constitutionally, the military participates actively in national political life and that it falls to them to guarantee the peaceful transition toward a classless socialist society within the framework of a pluralistic democratic organization.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The functioning of Portuguese political life since 1975 and constitutional logic show that the participation of the military in the political system does not occur through the intervention of the armed forces as such, but through the hierarchic body which represents them and to which they are subordinate, the Council of the Revolution.⁴ According to the constitutional text, the Council of the Revolution, made up of military officers elected following the events of 11 March and reorganized after 25 November, and of the commanders in chief of the land army, navy and air force, as well as the commander in chief of the armed forces, the president of the republic, should react forcefully against any effort or attempt to modify the historic mission of the armed forces written into the constitution, to wit, the defense of the democratic and socialist path. In the case of deviation from the means of achieving this goal, it is the duty of the council to intervene to correct these deviations. In other words, the representatives of the armed forces within the political regime have the task of guaranteeing the establishment and defense of the conditions deemed essential to make the passage from the democratic to the socialist phase viable. The clearly expressed intention to correct deviations and offset their effect on spontaneous undertakings and directions is indicative of the rigidity of the constitution.

Apart from this static interpretation, others have been set forth since 1976, one of them by the commanders in chief. They have a concept of the mission and function of the armed forces differing substantially from the static interpretation mentioned above. Their action, as responsible for the armed forces within the Council of the Revolution, is to do everything in their power to insure that the rhythm and development of Portuguese society is determined by the popular will freely expressed at the time of electoral consultation. There is, therefore, a notable difference in the interpretation of the text within the Council of the Revolution itself, between those who regard the armed forces as the binding force thanks to which the democratic society can build socialism, on the one hand, and those who regard the armed forces as but a tool for the defense of stable democratic norms, on the other.

Thanks to this ambiguity, Portugal has remained to date as if in a state of constitutional transition. To the best of our knowledge, neither the chief of state nor the commanders in chief nor any member of the six governments which have followed one upon the other since the constitution went into effect have ever made any reference to article 273 no 4. The president of the republic, who is moreover always presented as an inflexible defender of the constitution, said shortly after his election in 1976 that the historic mission of the armed forces was not to propel the country along the socialist path, but solely to serve as the unwavering defender of the national interest.⁵

The constitution has been to our day a sizable obstacle to any possibility of brutal intervention into political life by the military.

Despite the splits which divide the armed forces today and which, as has been said, are in large part the product of the clash between the president and the government, the armed forces as a whole seem to want to respect the limitations of the constitution. Based on the military view of the constitution, it seems unlikely that military efforts to promote an overthrow or a plebiscite are likely to occur in the near future, but if such should occur, one can imagine that the situation would not be resolved "gently" as was the case on 25 November 1975.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Spanish constitutional texts approved in 1978 are characterized, unlike the Portuguese constitution, by their flexibility.

Accepted by almost all the political forces with the exception of the militants in and sympathizers with Fraga Iribarne's popular alliance and the extreme right-wing movements supported by a substantial fraction of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, these texts derive from a spirit of reform, and not a desire to break with the legal order of Franco's day. The Spanish constitution is a constitution of concord, the product of an effort to harmonize relations among the members of a collective who had never known unity. It is an open, pliable constitution, adaptable to the democratic system, but it is also a confused constitution in part, because of the heterogeneous amalgam of articles whose sources were foreign constitutions.⁶ It is above all an ambiguous constitution in a number of sectors, and in particular where the role and place of the military in the functional life of the nation is concerned. The constitution has little to say about what Spaniards are accustomed to terming "de facto power," and since there are few interpretations by experts, one has some difficulty in establishing the degree to which the armed forces participated⁷ in the drafting of texts which seem, however, to have calmed the military, particularly because of the functions attributed to the king, to whom they owe obedience and fidelity.

There can be no doubt that the constitution, as a "contradictory crystallization of the balance of forces,"⁸ contributes major institutional changes, in particular in the realm of education and on the economic, social and religious levels. On the other hand, the changes concerning the main institutional support of the Franco regime, the armed forces, are almost nonexistent. The armed forces continue to be the sponsoring institution of the regime, with the only difference that from the protector of the institutional order, they have become the defender of the constitutional order. Article 8, no 1, of the 1978 constitution says in effect: "the armed forces, made up of the land army, air force and navy, have the task of guaranteeing the sovereignty and independence of Spain and defending its territorial integrity and constitutional order." Article 37 of the organic law of the state of the 1958 national movement said: "The armed forces of the nation, made up of the land, sea and air armies and the forces of public order, guarantee the unity and independence of the fatherland, the integrity of its territories, national security and the defense of the institutional order."

The scarcity of textual references where the place and role of the armed forces in the new Spanish society are concerned allows the military courts to continue to make use of the mechanisms utilized many times previously, although according to article 117 of the constitution, this should not be possible.¹⁰ What generally comes under civil jurisdiction elsewhere, such as the prosecution of journalists who offend the military hierarchy, for example, remains in the hands of the military courts in Spain.

The institutional control mechanisms of the old regime are far from efficient, and in the event that conflicts postponed but not resolved by the constitution should come up again, there is nothing to prevent the reestablishment of these mechanisms, above all if the inability of the royal authority to deal with rising terrorism becomes more acute.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOOTNOTES

1. The modernization of the Spanish armed forces which is in progress limits the extent to which the military can intervene in political life, even if its authors still point to the existence of a certain resistance on the part of the nationalist conservative faction to the changes planned. See, among other authors, Medhurst Kenneth, "The Military and the Prospects for Spanish Democracy," WEST EUROPEAN POLITICS, no 1, 1978.
2. "Democratic Spain," POUVOIRS, no 8, 1979. In addition to the numerous articles in this issue of the periodical POUVOIRS, and in particular that by Jordi Tura and Eliseo, "A Consensual Formulation," see also Claire Duval, "The Political and Constitutional Development of Spain Since the Death of General Franco," REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE, 1978, 44 (2); Fernando Prieto, "The 1978 Spanish Constitution," AGGIORNAMENTO SOCIALI, April 1979; Edith Jaillardou, "The Post-Franco State: The Consensus and Its Errors," REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE, 29 (2), 1979; Verdu Pablo Lucas, "The Singular Aspects of the Spanish Constituent Process," REVISTA DE ESTUDOS POLITICOS, 1978, no 1, LE MONDE 6/12/78.
3. "The 1976 Constitution of the Portuguese Republic," Empresa Nacional, 1976; Jorge Miranda, "The Participation of the Military in the Exercise of Sovereignty," (Articles 3, no 2; 10, no 1; 142a, 149 and 273 of the Constitution), Revista Nacao e Defesa, 5, 1978. See also Jose Miguel A. Judice, Revista Nacao e Defesa, no 4, 1978.
4. Established after 11 March 1975, the Council of the Revolution has many functions constitutionally. According to article 142 of the constitution, for example, it is the body which aids the president of the republic, who is its president, both on a consultative and a deliberative basis; it guarantees the regular functioning of the democratic institutions and the implementation of the constitution and fidelity to the spirit of 25 April 1974; it is a political and legislative body in military matters (this body approves military agreements), and it is the body representing the armed forces in general politics. The mediatory power the Council of the Revolution has exercised to date is today being challenged by the government and, in principle, this body will cease to function in the course of 1981.

See, among other references, the remarks by one of the members of the Council of the Revolution, Captain Sousa e Castro, "The Democratic and Constitutional Legitimacy of the Council of the Revolution," BALUARTE, nos 9 and 10, 1976.
5. Statements in defense of the constitution and the national interests were a constant in all of the addresses delivered by General Eanes. See in particular his speeches at the 25 April and 25 November commemoration ceremonies, LE MONDE, 25 April, 1980.
6. The 1978 constitution seemed in part to be a melange of other constitutions, in particular those of France, Germany, Italy and the 1976 Portuguese constitution. See "Foreign Sources of the Constitution," POUVOIRS, no 8, 1979.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

7. The interpretations of the participation of the armed forces in the drafting of the constitutional text are extremely few. With regard to the role and the functions of the military in the constitution, see articles 8, 30, 56, 62, 63, 94, 95 and 104. The 29 December 1978 text was reproduced in the periodical POUVOIRS, no 8, 1979, among others.
8. Tierno Galvan, "The Constitution, Contradictory Crystallization of a Balance of Forces," POUVOIRS, no 8, 1979.
9. "The Spanish Constitution, Basic Laws of the State," Spanish Information Service, Madrid, 1972.
10. The activity of the military courts remained very important in the period following Franco, to impart to the ambiguity of the constitutional prohibition, described in particular in article 117, nos 1 and 6, as well as in the portion dealing with the "Court System," in which there is not the slightest mention of the military courts or military judges. One of the main targets of the emergency courts is journalists. The editors of the newspapers DIARIO 16 and EL PAIS were sentenced to several months in prison and fined for having published articles or editorials critical of the military institution.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 Strategique

5157

CSO: 3100/713

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

POLITICAL

FRANCE

BRIEFS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL--The departure of Mr Marences, anticipated for some months now, has been the occasion for the cadres of the SDECE [Foreign Intelligence and Counterintelligence Service], which he has headed for the past 11 years, to request the creation of a "National Security Council" based on the American model. This council would stand at the apex of the French intelligence and strategic analysis services which now fall under the jurisdiction of the prime minister, the minister of defense, and the armed forces general staff. [Text] [COPYRIGHT: 1981 "Valeurs Actuelles"] [Paris VALEURS ACTUELLES in French 9 May 81 p 2] 2662

CSO: 3100/755

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

POLITICAL INSTABILITY, DEVELOPING SCHISMS WITHIN MILITARY

Paris LA PENINSULE LUSO-IBERIQUE in French 1980 (signed to press 3rd quarter of 1980) pp 135-142, 224

[Excerpts from Chapter 4 ("Portugal: From Political Instability to Rifts Within the Military Hierarchy") of Part 3 ("Military Intervention: Inciting and Inhibiting Factors") in the book "The Luso-Iberian Peninsula" by Alberto Santos, National Defense Studies Foundation, Journal No 18, Supplement to Paris STRATEGIQUE in French, issue no 8 (4th quarter of 1980) 235 pp]

[Excerpts] Today as yesterday, the tensions and the clashes in society have gained full access to the military institution. The confrontation between the president and the government is adding still more confusion and perplexity to the general political situation. It is profoundly affecting the esprit de corps and is tending to radicalize positions within the armed forces.

President Eanes himself, concerned about the repercussions this clash might have on the military institution and worried about the direct appeals made by certain civilian and governmental personalities to military officers known for their anti-constitutional position, says he will pursue every avenue in order to prevent the development of schisms within the military institution from leading in the direction of dictatorship.

In order to achieve a better understanding of the nature of these schisms, it would be well to situate the guidelines of the general government policy schematically.

The government of Mr Sa Carneiro soon evidenced a stubborn political desire to challenge a certain number of constitutional gains resulting for the most part from the points won during the so-called revolutionary period lasting from 11 March 1975 until 25 November of that same year. Among the numerous constitutional gains challenged by the current government, that pertaining to the changes made on the level of the ownership structure stands out particularly.

All of the sectors of productive life experienced the effects of the chain nationalizations which followed the attempted Spínola coup d'état on 11 March 1975. The state then became the owners' owner--it controls about 60 percent of the industrial sector, all the national banks, insurance companies and the most important transportation companies. The distribution and the social modalities of the power things give some men over others have been equally drastically changed. Thus sometimes unprecedented demands in the fields of housing, leisure time, education and culture are expanding.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

These gains, endorsed in the constitution in 1976, contributed more or less directly to frustrating both the centralizing and bureaucratic efforts of the two last provisional governments of Mr Goncalves and the inconsistent improvising of the two Soares socialist constitutional governments, which fell victim to his overly limited vision of national problems and his lack of finesse in foreign policy.

These gains also caused the failure of the efforts of the two governments which followed those of the socialists, to wit the governments of Messrs Nobre Da Costa and Mota Pinto, who sought to revise these gains.

The deterioration of the present social and political climate is basically the result of the divorce seen between a government which clearly expresses the need to challenge the major part of these gains, and a constitutionalist military leader, president Eanes, who nonetheless recognizes the need to use legal means to revise some aspects of the constitution which, it is true, is somewhat out of phase in terms of the present reality.

In its frontal attack on the constitutional gains which have been in part placed on the agenda again thanks to the singular action of the government of Mrs Pintassilgo, the government is provoking a rise in the temperature within the military institution, wherein a large number of officers had accepted the 1976 constitution with some reservations.

The president is also the target of attacks by the government because of his tolerance of the PCP and the trade union movement it controls. It would not be incorrect, in fact, to state that despite the anticommunism voiced by Eanes at the beginning of his term, there has been, as the deterioration in the political and economic situation has advanced, a kind of objective complicity between the PCP and General Eanes, the man of order, balance and efficiency.

On numerous occasions the president has voiced the need for Portugal to base its foreign relations on the strengthening of relations with the Portuguese-speaking nations.

One can also see a certain revival of the Atlantic sympathies expressed by the president at the beginning of his term. He continues to state that NATO remains effective and indispensable so long as the Warsaw Pact continues to exist, but he seems somewhat skeptical as to the nature of American interests in Portugal.

In attempting the ideological vaccination of a body which enabled the democratic process to begin and which continues to exert a notable influence on the political direction of the country, after having controlled the state apparatus, the government is indirectly encouraging the development of schisms within the military institution. The ideological vaccine, destined basically for the "political military officers" and in particular the leftist ones in the Council of the Revolution, leads each of the members of this body to adopt a clearer position, either on the right or on the left, and provokes feelings of animosity and suspicion toward the president of the republic.

Uncertainty is increasing within the military body, to the point that the president felt constrained to prohibit the participation in the government for the first time. With the assumption of its functions by the Democratic Alliance

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

government, the communications media, and certain newspapers in particular, have encouraged the break between the government, the president and the Council of the Revolution by alarmist rumors. The newspapers have even reported the preparation of a coup d'etat sponsored by the leftist members of the Council of the Revolution, toward whom the president is said to have evidenced considerable sympathy.

This kind of clash has not been without its effect on the level of the military hierarchy itself, which is today the focus of virulent criticism, in particular because of the errors committed in the process of selecting superior officers, as well as in the interpretation of the trials of the right-wing military officers involved in the 11 March events or the leftist military officers involved in those of 25 November.

After 25 November 1975, the leadership of the land army, as well as that of the navy, was in the hands of higher officers who, under the pressure of events, supported what has come to be called the democratic spirit of 25 April, but who very often view themselves as conservatives. The commanders in chief of the three armed branches established promotion norms after the events of November 1975 based on political criteria rather than competence, which caused upsets within each of the branches. Generally, promotions are based on access provided to the courses of the Institute of Higher Military Studies or the National Defense Institute. It should be noted that the officers' discontent with the procedures is most often seen in those who did not adhere to the limitations of 25 April, and who have always maintained neutrality in their conduct in relation to the developments. As a result of this process of promotion to the ranks of colonel and general, we have witnessed a substantial increase of the so-called moderate and leftist military in the elections to the council of the land army, navy and air force.

The gap between the hierarchy and the officers' corps is widening.

The commanders in chief sometimes push the individuality of their respective branches to the extreme, and this is not without its consequences in the cohesion of the hierarchy itself as a whole. A striking example of this search for individuality was the decision made in March of 1979 by the commander in chief of the air force, General Lemos Ferreira, to suspend the military exercises planned within the framework of NATO, without consulting the general staff itself, because of the rejection of the Mota Pinto government budget by the Assembly of the Republic. This hasty and intemperate attitude on the part of General Ferreira provoked reactions within the armed forces, because it is well known that the contribution the Portuguese air force makes to the military operations of NATO is very limited. Brigadier General Franco Charais, a member of the Council of the Revolution, was one of those who sharply denounced the attitude of the air force commander in chief.

Apart from the procedures used in promoting officers to higher rank, the current directions in the military policy of the general staffs affect the sergeants and other noncommissioned and commissioned officers who, because of the elimination of certain units, are being forced today to leave the cities in which they have long been stationed. As a result of this complex of discriminatory measures, the schisms within the armed forces are being aggravated to the point that a large number of commissioned and noncommissioned officers today have joined together and created the Unified Movement of the Armed Forces (MUFA).*

*Among the military sponsoring the creation of this movement, there are indeed the majority of the officers who participated actively in the 25 April military operation, including Commander Vasco Lourenco, a member of the Council of the Revolution. An association of April military officers will be formed, it is said, by the end of 1980.

18

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

It cannot be denied that the modernization of the armed forces which is being carried out has made it possible to reestablish certain ethical imperatives challenged during the tumultuous months of the summer of 1975, but the military hierarchy has not been able to wipe out all the traces of this "military moment." Consequences of the forms of democratization introduced in the barracks then still survive today, and the desire to participate in political discussions, as well as the establishment of the MUFA itself, are among them.

The resolution of the moral crisis through which the armed forces are passing will not happen tomorrow, and it may even be made more acute with the overwhelming re-election of General Eanes in December 1980.

Conclusion

There can be no doubt that the schisms which are to be seen both within the Spanish and the Portuguese armed forces, as well as the rise of terrorism in Spain, hang heavy as a threat to the survival of democratic institutions. However, in our view, the chance of the resurgence in the near future of the kind of extremist military movement which would have the support of the whole of the military body as such seems minimal. The possibility of intervention by the military in the political life of the two countries cannot, however, be totally excluded. Such possibilities will depend in large part on the development of political life in general, and on the nature of the relations between the military institution and the civilian regime, as well as the development of a series of factors we have attempted to deal with throughout this chapter.

The attitude which might be adopted by the new generation of officers, based on the development of political and social life in the two countries, also seems to us to be a factor which has not been discussed, because of the lack of documentation on the content of the programs offered in the academies, but a factor which would have to be taken into account if a new legitimacy crisis were to arise in the years to come.

In Portugal, the number of recruits in the last class to enroll in the academy was 570, which is a substantial number in comparison to those of the last years of the colonial period, in the course of which there was evidence of a distaste for the academies on the part of young men fearful of the likelihood of war, but it is not a very high number if one considers the high rate of employment among young people.

The curricula in the Portuguese academies have undergone changes, in particular during the prerevolutionary period in the summer of 1975, but today everything appears to be in order again, since their respective directors are for the most part officers heavily committed to military ethics and discipline.

The young recruits to whom we talked gave evidence of being both more sensitive to and more open on the subject of national defense problems than the higher officers, indeed the middle level cadres, usually are. They seem particularly aware that their country is very vulnerable both on the political-military and economic levels. They appear to us to be resolutely persuaded that the only way of remedying this situation is to insist on an enduring effort to modernize the armed forces as a whole.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In Spain, a country in which more than 70 percent of the population is under 25 years of age, the problem of the young generation of officers is more sharply posed than in Portugal, among others, because toward the end of the 1980s the higher officers who participated in the civil war will be gone. Unfortunately, we were not able to obtain access to the content of the curricula in the military academies which, as is the case in Portugal, are headed by military officers known for their conservatism, with the exception of some indications as to the development of the program content in the Civil Guard which, as we explained earlier, is hesitant as to the value of the democratic gain and continues to engage in self-recruiting.

It appears that the teaching of political science and the juridical sciences in the academies has been encouraged recently, but what attracts notice above all is that the young recruits in these countries who have lived through five civil wars in the period of one century hope to avoid any clash which might lead to domestic armed conflict.

COPYRIGHT: 1980 Strategique

5157

CSO: 3100/715

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

MILITARY

FRANCE

BUDGETED MILITARY STRENGTH FOR CURRENT YEAR DETAILED

Paris AIR & COSMOS in French 9 May 81 p 35

[Article: "Budgetary Allocations for Military Personnel"]

[Text] For the year under way the budgetary allocations for the military personnel of the armed forces and services--involved are career personnel and draftees paid from the budget of the Ministry of Defense--cover 574,777 personnel. They are broken down as follows:

Strategic nuclear forces	18,827
Tactical nuclear forces	8,259
Conventional forces	373,970
Overseas forces	16,615
Research and testing	6,350
Personnel training	78,848
Personnel support	34,604
Equipment support	18,771
General administration	18,533

The breakdown by services is as follows: Army, 314,177; Navy, 67,968; Air Force, 100,427; Gendarmerie, 79,026; Military Justice and Health, 8,887; DGA [General Directorate of Administration], 4,085; central administration and general control, 207. From a budgetary viewpoint the breakdown of draftees is as follows: 198,792 in the Army; 18,009 in the Navy; 38,455 in the Air Force.

COPYRIGHT: A. & C. Paris 1981

2662
CSO: 3100/755

END

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY